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Abstract
We study the household sector’s post-tax income and debt position as prop-
agation mechanisms of public into private spending, in postwar U.S. data. In
structural VARs, we obtain the consumption “crowding-in puzzle” for surges
in public spending and show this consumption response to be accompanied
by a persistent increase in disposable income. Endogenously reacting income,
however, is insufficient to rationalize conditional comovement of private and
public spending: once we hypothetically force (dis)aggregate measures of in-
come to their pre-shock paths, consumption still rises. Corroborating these
findings within an external-instruments-identified VAR, which constitutes an
adequate laboratory for the simultaneous interplay of financial and macroe-
conomic time-series, we provide causal evidence of fiscal stimulus prompting
households to take on more credit. This favorable debt cycle is paralleled
by dropping interest rates, narrowing credit spreads, and inflating collat-
eral prices, e.g., real estate prices, suggesting that softening borrowing con-
straints support the accumulation of debt and help rationalizing the absence
of crowding-out.
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1 Introduction
Is impacting after-tax income an important transmission mechanism by which in-
creases in public spending stimulate private consumption expenditures and, thereby,
the broader economy? A vast amount of macroeconomic time-series contributions
have established the finding of systematic crowding-in of household spending—
induced by unexpected variation in public spending—to be a salient feature in
postwar U.S. data.1 So far, however, the literature has not converged to a con-
sensus when it comes to the underlying drivers of the conditional comovement of
private and public spending. While the traditional Keynesian paradigm predicts
an income-induced rise of consumption, the empirical regularity of consumption
crowding-in poses a challenge for plain-vanilla New Keynesian and RBC models,
in which “throw-in-the-ocean” public spending induces negative wealth effects and
causes optimizing households to substitute from consumption to labor supply.
Several routes have been taken to align these models with the conflicting evi-
dence by introducing mechanisms that are designed to weaken the negative wealth
effect, i.e., the reduction of present-value after-tax income, that public stimulus
brings about for households.2 Gal´ı et al. (2007) propose a direct approach to make
dynamics in sticky price (wage) models dependent on current income by adding Non-
Ricardians, that is, households that do not hold physical capital and who consume
their earnings in each period. Versions of this “limited asset market participation” or
“Two-Agent New Keynesian” model have been commonly adopted in the literature.3
Notably, “Heterogeneous-Agent New Keynesian” models (Kaplan et al., 2018) rely
on richer representations of household finance, but generally feature consumers that,
in equilibrium, behave in an income-constrained fashion (Bilbiie, 2019). Overall, the
common ingredient to solve the consumption “crowding-in puzzle” across large parts
of the fiscal policy literature can be summarized as: impacting income.
In this paper, we take one step back and revisit the role of disposable income as a
1See, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Fata´s and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Ravn et al. (2012), and Perotti (2014). Among contributions
studying news shocks on military spending, i.e., anticipated variation in government spending,
Fisher and Peters (2010), Forni and Gambetti (2016), and Ben Zeev and Pappa (2017) docu-
ment crowding-in of consumption, while Ramey (2011) reports contractionary effects. Caldara and
Kamps (2008) show that postwar U.S. data favor a conditional public-private-spending comove-
ment, across identification schemes, once model specifications are harmonized.
2An incomplete selection includes, inter alia, deep-habits in consumption (Ravn et al., 2012),
non-separable preferences between consumption and labor (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008), or useful
and productive spending (Leeper et al., 2017; Sims and Wolff, 2018).
3See Corsetti et al. (2012), Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015), and McKay and Reis (2016) for
academic approaches or the FRB/US model for a central bank adoption.
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propagation mechanism for public spending, directly in the data. Our approach con-
sists of explicitly modeling post-tax income in structural VARs, thus imposing only
few assumptions and structure to recover public spending shocks. As a point of de-
parture, we center around an updated version of the recursively-identified (Blanchard
and Perotti, 2002) VAR proposed by Gal´ı et al. (2007), covering data from 1954Q1
to 2015Q4.4 We identify plausibly unexpected variation in government spending
by contemporaneously conditioning on a proxy for fiscal foresight and report that
debt-financed fiscal stimulus jointly raises consumption along with post-tax income.
Nevertheless, the public spending induced consumption-income-comovement is at
best suggestive to an income-channel that may causally rationalize why consumption
is not crowded out, contrary to Neoclassical models. Essentially, it is the extra effect
that income adds to the response of consumption, which matters for this narrative.
We approximate this extra effect of the income-channel via a statistical decompo-
sition. Following the procedure in Bachmann and Sims (2012), we neutralize the
endogenous income response with counteracting, exogenous surprises in after-tax
income. In the absence of income dynamics, the macroeconomic repercussions of
fiscal stimulus are muted, but notably, household absorption still reveals an inverted
hump-shaped adjustment pattern. In our preferred model specification, the income-
channel explains around one-third of the reaction of consumption; yet, crowding-out
does not appear to be an empirical regularity, even when post-tax income remains
hypothetically fixed. This finding extends to the entire income distribution; that
is, when studying the propagation via, and the marginal effects of, disaggregate
income-measures, as provided by Piketty et al. (2018), we arrive at similar inference
relative to the aggregate counterpart.
The evidence of households being capable of expanding consumption volumes—
without supporting income—suggests that households’ debt position may adjust to
finance the additional spending; that is, consumption crowding-in may be reinforced
by debt accumulation. In this vein, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010) shows how financial
frictions may amplify the consequences of public stimulus. His model predicts that
crowding-out of investment is counteracted once government spending propagates
via imperfect financial markets (see Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012). While he
emphasizes a (reverse) mechanism a` la Fisher’s debt-deflation, Carrillo and Poilly
(2013) stress that the propagation of stimulus through the value of firms’ collateral
may directly narrow credit spreads and support equilibrium debt. To the extent
4We focus on postwar data and thus mainly on civilian spending shocks. This focus is consistent
with Perotti (2014) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) who stress that samples covering the
Korean war or WWII may cause identification problems due to, e.g., price controls or rationing.
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that households face similar credit market imperfections, and borrowing constraints
are conditionally mitigated, an expansion of household debt is equally conceivable.5
We provide empirical aid to this proposition by carefully modeling the joint
dynamics of households’ credit conditions and the fiscal policy stance. First, we
explore the conditional interplay of prices and quantities in credit markets, i.e., pri-
vate interest rates/spreads and debt volumes, in fiscal policy VARs. Second, we
note that the recursiveness assumption to recover the VAR’s structural form is no
longer warranted, once fast-moving financial variables are present (see Gertler and
Karadi, 2015).6 To separate fiscal policy surprises from systematic reactions to, e.g.,
the state of the financial system, we augment the VAR by an external instrument
(SVAR-IV) for identification (Stock and Watson, 2012; Mertens and Ravn, 2013),
allowing for simultaneous feedback to public spending from all variables in the sys-
tem. Following Barro and Redlick (2011), we use changes in military spending as an
instrument. Military spending exhibits substantial swings over time and plausibly
exhibits comovement with the unobserved policy innovations of interest (instrument
relevance). In addition, military expenditures regularly reflect developments abroad,
e.g., geopolitical instability, such that variation induced by domestic economic or fi-
nancial conditions appears to be meager, in relative terms (exclusion restriction).7
Our main observations for debt-augmented fiscal SVAR-IVs are twofold. First,
unexpected variation of public spending causally induces proxies for household credit
such as consumer credit, mortgage debt, or total household indebtedness to expand
significantly and persistently—in excess to a continuing rise in post-tax income and
consumption. This striking interaction of household debt and the fiscal policy stance
aligns with Cloyne and Surico (2017), who track variation in U.K. tax rates, and
with Bernardini and Peersman (2018), who stress private debt as a state variable
for fiscal output-multipliers.8 Yet, both papers are silent on the role of private
debt as a transmission mechanism for public spending. Second, the conditional debt
cycle we document is paralleled by declining interest rates in credit markets. This
finding corroborates Ramey (2011), who reports falling bond rates conditional on
5Miranda-Pinto et al. (2019) propose that fiscal stimulus may relax credit market conditions
via redistribution of income toward saving agents.
6Caldara and Kamps (2017) make the case that even with respect to aggregate activity there may
exist some degree of within-quarter endogeneity of recursively-recovered fiscal policy innovations.
For forward-looking financial time-series, which are strongly correlated with and typically lead the
business cycle, such concerns are likely to apply even more so.
7In fact, our instrument reveals close-to-zero and insignificant contemporaneous, unconditional
correlation coefficients regarding changes in U.S. GDP or interest rates/spreads. To formally test
instrument-relevance, we rely on methodological progress of Montiel Olea et al. (2018).
8Demyanyk et al. (2019) study consumer debt as a state variable for open-economy relative
fiscal multipliers using geographical variation in U.S. defense spending during the Great Recession.
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positive news shocks about military spending. However, neither does she relate her
finding to the debt position of households, as we do, nor does her VAR address the
simultaneity problem between financial and macroeconomic variables.9 Moreover,
our findings reinforce Auerbach et al. (2020), who exploit geographical variation
in U.S. federal contracts across U.S. cities and find positive effects on local credit
markets in data starting at the millennium. Our time-series approach puts their
evidence into perspective and provides external validity by exploring the entire U.S.
postwar history and by explicitly capturing general equilibrium effects.
Overall, the conditional divergence of credit market volumes and prices we ob-
serve supports the perception of reinforcing financial conditions strengthening the
expansion of debt and, ultimately, the crowding-in of consumption. We provide
tentative evidence on the transmission mechanisms underlying our results. First, as
we do not reveal inflationary pressure to be unleashed by the surge in public spend-
ing, we conjecture that the conditional debt cycle does not appear to be induced
by Fisher effects (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, 2010). Second and aligning with the docu-
mented price-dynamics, we find no tightening of (real) policy or long-term risk-free
rates; this absence of counteracting risk-free rates may thus contribute to the debt
accumulation of households. Third, our SVAR-IV model reveals a significant com-
pression of interest spreads in credit markets suggesting a softening of borrowing
constraints, that is, easier access to credit for households (Auerbach et al., 2020).
Fourth, this loosening of borrowing conditions is likely related to inflating asset
prices: we document that public stimulus boosts collateral values such as real estate
prices, which should positively impact on households’ balance sheets and may re-
duce their (perceived) default probabilities (see Bernanke et al., 1999, for the related
financial accelerator mechanism).
Taken together, our findings imply that income dynamics of households are likely
an insufficient empirical moment to help expand our knowledge about the underlying
drivers of the propagation of public into private spending. Our causal evidence
on credit-augmented fiscal policy VARs prompts the view that the pass-through
of stimulus into households’ debt position constitutes a vital mechanism to make
progress toward that direction.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical setting
and evidence on income. Section 3 explores debt-augmented VARs, Section 4 pro-
vides tentative insight into the transmission mechanisms, and Section 5 concludes.
9This concern regarding narrative identification in general is also expressed by Ramey (2016).
D’Alessandro et al. (2019) and Miranda-Pinto et al. (2019) also report declining interest rates
conditional on surges in public spending, relying on exclusion restrictions that identify their VARs.
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2 Empirical framework
In this Section, we provide a structural VAR framework that we use to study the
propagation of government spending to the broader economy, in particular, to con-
sumption and disposable income of households. First, we describe the data and the
identification strategy; second, we propose a method to isolate the contribution of
post-tax income in the shock pass-through; and third, we present empirical results.
2.1 Structural VAR representation
We postulate that the variables of interest can be cast in a finite-order linear VAR
representation of the form:
A0xt =
p∑
l=1
Alxt−l + εt, with E{εt} = 0 and E{εtεt′} = Σε, (1)
abstracting from the intercept for notational convenience. At lag, l = 1, ..., p, the
n × n matrix Al comprises the model’s dynamics, and A0 captures contempora-
neous relations. εt represents mutually uncorrelated innovations, i.e., Σε is diago-
nal. We identify a government spending shock by a Cholesky-factorization of the
VAR’s reduced-form variance-covariance matrix, Ω, assuming government spend-
ing to be pre-determined with respect to within-quarter macroeconomic conditions
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). For direct comparability with the VAR evidence
in Gal´ı et al. (2007), we stick to this strategy as the basic structure for identifica-
tion, but relax the identification assumption in Section 3. However, such a purely
recursive approach to recover the VAR’s structural form may be subject to fiscal
foresight concerns, i.e., the structural innovations may be forecastable, to some ex-
tent. Therefore, we recover plausibly unanticipated innovations in the fiscal policy
stance by simultaneously conditioning public spending in the structural VAR on
measures of fiscal news. As a baseline, we follow Bachmann and Sims (2012) and
augment the VAR by military news, gmt , as proposed in Ramey (2011), ordered first
in xt, followed by government spending (consumption plus investment), gt, ordered
second. Results are similar when conditioning on proxies as provided in Fisher and
Peters (2010) or Ben Zeev and Pappa (2017), or when omitting news alltogether.
The remaining j = 3, ..., n entries in vector xt comprise the variables of the Gal´ı
et al. (2007) VAR, in this order: personal disposable income, ydist , GDP, yt, hours
worked, ht, consumption (non-durables and services), ct, non-residential investment,
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it, wages, wt, and the budget deficit, dt.
10 The after-tax income series we explore is
extensive, comprising the following sources of income: U.S. residents’ labor income,
employer-provided supplements such as insurance, income from owning a business
or from rental property, benefits from social security, interest income, and dividends;
the series explicitly excludes valuation effects stemming from asset price movements.
We estimate the VAR over a sample beginning in 1954Q1 and extending to
2015Q4, including four lags of the vector of quarterly observables, i.e., p = 4. The
start of the sample is motivated by, inter alia, Perotti (2014) and Nakamura and
Steinsson (2014), who argue that including the WWII era may cause identification
problems as the influence of interfering factors like price and production controls,
rationing, or the military draft are hard to assess. Similarly, during the Korean war,
results may be contaminated by new Fed regulations at the time. The impact of
these events is particularly hard to gauge in military spending news identification
approaches as, e.g., in Ramey (2011), in which results are mainly driven by the
defense spending shocks during wars, whereas in the sample starting in 1954Q1
civilian spending shocks prevail. For the benchmark model, we end the sample in
2015Q4 due to the availability of proxies for fiscal foresight. We find throughout
consistent results in estimations that omit the Great Recession episode; and we
explore additional sub-sample sensitivity in Section 2.3.
2.2 A systematic analysis of the disposable-income-channel in a VAR
In this Section, we propose a procedure to statistically single out and approximate the
marginal effect that impacting post-tax income adds to the response of consumption,
within the structural VAR framework above. In this vein, the original argument put
forth in, e.g., Gal´ı et al. (2007) to call for an immediate income mechanism in New
Keynesian models was based, among others, on the empirical comovement of private
consumption and income after fiscal stimulus. This justification, however, builds
upon a conditional consumption-income-correlation and not on a causal relation, in
a statistical sense. We attempt to give perspective to the latter.
Our strategy consists of statistically decomposing the repercussions of public
spending into those effects arising from the endogenous response of disposable in-
come and those observed after fixing this transmission variable to its pre-shock
10The budget deficit enters as a ratio to trend GDP, proxied by lagged potential output; all
measures enter at the quarterly frequency in real terms. Quantity series are population-normalized.
Except for the budget deficit, which we measure in percent, time-series enter in log levels.
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path.11 Specifically, we quantify the so-defined marginal effect of income by positing
hypothetical sequences of exogenous, Cholesky-factor-orthogonalized innovations in
disposable income. We calculate the latter innovations such as to neutralize the en-
dogenous response of post-tax income, conditional on the initial government spend-
ing surprise. Contrasting the benchmark response of consumption with the cor-
responding response absent movements in income, allows to infer the quantitative
importance of the income-channel for the projected path of private consumption. By
exactly canceling out the endogenous response of post-tax income, the exercise is
capable of capturing rich effects, since the entire sprectrum of directly and indirectly
operating effects stemming from the income-variable are shut down. Consequently,
we view the corresponding results as an upper bound approximation of an indepen-
dently operating income-channel.
Importantly, this decomposition is purely statistical in nature. For this reason,
we do not assign any economic interpretation to the disposable income surprises
we generate. By ordering personal disposable income after public spending in the
VAR model, income surprises are allowed to contemporaneously pass-through to all
variables in the system, except for government spending (and fiscal news).12
In a recursive setting, we compute the innovations to variable ydist ≡ η, that are
necessary to force the respective endogenous response to zero, as follows:
εη,h = −
n∑
j=1
Θη,jyj,h −
min(p,h)∑
m=1
n∑
j=1
Θη,mn+jzj,h−m. (2)
yj,0 denotes the t = 0 effect of a spending shock on variable j, whereas the same
effect sans endogenous response of income reads: zj,0 = yj,0 + Φj,η,0εη,0/ση, where
Φj,η,0 is the {j, η} element of the impulse response matrix for horizon h = 0. The
standard deviation of income disturbances is ση, and for horizons h > 0 we calculate:
yj,h =
min(p,h)∑
m=1
n∑
i=1
Θj,mn+izj,h−m +
n∑
i<j
Θj,iyi,h, (3)
and ultimately:
zj,h = yj,h +
Φj,η,0εη,h
ση
. (4)
11Bachmann and Sims (2012) revitalize this method, which was pioneered by Bernanke et al.
(1997), and apply it to the reaction of consumer confidence in their Cholesky-identified fiscal VAR.
Recent applications include Bachmann and Ru¨th (2020).
12In the model of Gal´ı et al. (2007), disposable income was ordered last in the VAR. Note
however, that the position of income does only matter for the reduced-form disposable income
surprises, but does not have any statistical impact on the dynamics triggered by the fiscal policy
shock. As a matter of fact, the ordering within the sub-set of variables j = 3, ..., n is orthogonal
to the results for the public stimulus shock, with public spending ordered second, i.e., j = 2.
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2.3 An empirical perspective on the income-channel of public stimulus
Ignoring the dashed lines for the moment, Figure 1 traces VAR dynamics (solid blue
lines) conditional on an expansionary government spending surprise, for quarterly
U.S. data ranging from 1954Q1 to 2015Q4. Dark to light shaded areas depict 50,
68, and 90 percent confidence intervals, obtained from a bootstrapping procedure
(Goncalves and Kilian, 2004). We normalize the shock size such as to move public
spending by one percent away from its pre-shock path, following convention and for
comparability across different specifications.
Figure 1: Government spending shock: conditional dynamics
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Notes: We plot dynamics at the quarterly frequency. Solid blue lines represent point
estimates of impulse response functions. Dark to light shaded areas display 50, 68, and 90
percent confidence intervals, which we obtain from 1,000 replications of a recursive-design
wild bootstrap procedure. Dashed blue lines denote results for a fixed disposable income
experiment, along the lines of Bachmann and Sims (2012).
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Despite the fact that we account for fiscal foresight and use a longer sample
relative to Gal´ı et al. (2007), whose data end in 2003Q4, we report fully consistent
dynamics. Consumption rises sluggishly for two years, before slowly abating and the
response is significantly positive for more than three years; that is, we observe the
consumption crowding-in puzzle. GDP mimics the consumption response qualita-
tively and peaks at almost 0.4 percent. The budget deficit increases on impact and
reaches the maximum response of 0.3 percentage points shortly after the impact
period, i.e., we study a deficit-financed public spending innovation. In addition,
we reveal Keynesian dynamics by documenting pro-cyclically responding wages and
hours, over the medium run.13 Investment responds negatively to stimulus, but in-
significantly so.14 In line with the labor market dynamics, post-tax income is sticky
in the first year after the shock, but subsequently reveals a protracted, inverted
hump-shaped impulse response, which deviates by more than 0.2 percent from its
conditional mean, and which remains different from zero in a statistically significant
sense for roughly two years.
The dashed blue lines in Figure 1 contrast the benchmark VAR’s impulse re-
sponses (solid blue lines) with corresponding dynamics observed for a fixed-income
scenario. As the solid and dashed lines in the government spending panel are very
similar, zeroing-out the disposable income response does barely affect the systematic
reaction of public spending to the exogenous shock, i.e. we essentially study the same
fiscal stimulus hitting the economy. Post-tax income does, per definition, not react
in the fixed-income experiment. The remaining variables’ impulse responses in the
fixed-income scenario closely track the responses of the benchmark model at short
horizons, which is consistent with the protracted reaction of post-tax income in the
unrestricted case. Over medium horizons, however, the income-channel appears to
become operative. The zeroing-out of income makes the GDP reaction more short-
lived and mutes its maximum response by roughly one-third. Wages become less
pro-cyclical in the shock propagation and investment as well as hours worked process
the shock via declining impulse responses. The public deficit is somewhat amplified,
which—given an almost unchanged path of public spending—aligns with the doc-
umented lower aggregate activity and thus lower tax revenues. Most importantly,
household absorption behaves qualitatively similar to the GDP response; that is,
the maximum increase is mitigated and the impulse response returns faster toward
13Note that the positively reacting real wage that we document empirically is typically also the
key ingredient within several New Keynesian approaches that aim to strengthen the income-channel
and, ultimately, attempt to rationalize consumption crowding-in.
14Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) report an investment decline,
while Fata´s and Mihov (2001) document an increase.
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its conditional mean. In accumulated terms, the fixed-income scenario predicts a
surge in consumption that is roughly one-third smaller relative to the unrestricted
VAR case. Yet, even when we shut down the income-channel, there is no evidence of
consumption crowding-out, in contrast to what Neoclassical theory would predict.
Put differently, we infer that the conditional dynamics of disposable income are not
sufficient to rationalize why consumption is crowded-in by public spending surprises.
In what follows, we scrutinize this finding for different samples and for disaggre-
gate measures of post-tax income of households in order to learn more about the
structural properties of our result.
The income-channel during different postwar episodes Given the sub-
stantial time-series dimension we have exploited so far, it is instructive to inspect
the stability of our results across different postwar episodes. For the different sub-
samples we consider in what follows, Figure 2 summarizes the maximum impulse
response coefficients (blue circles), along with 90 percent confidence intervals (black
lines), for income (upper panel) and consumption (lower panel) to a one percent gov-
ernment spending expansion. In the Figure’s lower panel, the red diamonds further
present the corresponding reaction of consumption in a fixed-income scenario.
A natural sample modification involves the omission of the Great Recession dur-
ing which, inter alia, the effective lower bound on short-term nominal interest rates
became binding. We thus follow the dating convention in Ramey and Zubairy (2018),
who however do not document significant non-linearities stemming from the zero
lower bound, and end the sample in 2008Q3. Our result of a positive and significant
shock procession of disposable income and consumption appears to be insensitive
to the exclusion of the Great Recession period (utmost left element of Figure 2); in
addition, the consumption response in the fixed-income scenario is muted by roughly
one-third, but still positive as in the benchmark sample. Another potential source
of parameter instability may be the transition from macroeconomic turbulence wit-
nessed in the U.S. during, e.g., the ’70s, to a more tranquil episode starting in the
’80s that was subsequently coined the Great Moderation episode. Following, among
others, Gambetti and Gal´ı (2009) we split the sample into pre- and post-1984 data.
The second and third element in Figure 2 depict the corresponding results. For
pre-Great-Moderation data, the reaction of household consumption is similar to the
baseline model, yet estimated with somewhat higher precision, while the income re-
sponse is magnified. Interestingly, the marginal effect that after-tax income adds to
the consumption response is substantial such that the consumption reactions with
and without hypothetically fixed-income are statistically different from each other.
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Figure 2: Consumption and income: sub-samples and disaggregate income data
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Notes: Blue circles denote the maximum reaction of, respectively, disposable income (up-
per panel) and private consumption (lower panel) to a one percent increase in government
spending; the black lines depict 90 percent confidence intervals. The red diamonds in
the lower panel measure the consumption reaction for a scenario, in which the income re-
sponse remains hypothetically fixed. The first four estimates in each panel report results
for sample splits as denoted on the abscissa. The remaining five estimates correspond to
VARs using disaggregate income measures, where we interpolated the annual data to the
quarterly frequency.
For the episode starting in 1984 the consumption reaction is somewhat muted,
but still significantly positive, whereas this is no longer true for disposable income;
its maximum impulse response is statistically not different from zero, and the extra
effect that income adds to the consumption response is practically zero. This latter
finding could loosely be interpreted as constituting an unrestricted counterfactual
answering the question on how consumption responds to fiscal stimulus without
supporting income dynamics since the Great Moderation. The answer is: still posi-
tively. That is, consumption crowding-in appears to remain an empirical regularity.
Consequently, it is hard to justify the income-channel as constituting the structural
solution to this empirical puzzle. Our sub-sample finding as well as the hypotheti-
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cal fixed-income exercise are thus suggestive of other transmission channels of fiscal
policy being operative in excess to impacting income.
Public stimulus along the income distribution Models of the limited asset
market participation type emphasize the role of household heterogeneity with regard
to consumption behavior. In these models, a subset of constrained agents increases
consumption in proportion to a temporary, stimulus-induced windfall in income.
Unconstrained agents, by contrast, reduce consumption independent from their cur-
rent income, in line with the permanent income hypothesis. Could our aggregate
time-series results mask important underlying composition effects along these lines?
Under highly stylized conditions, a transmission mechanism along these lines
is conceivable to be operative within our time-series evidence; despite aggregate
income remaining conditionally fixed or insignificant (as for the post-84 sample evi-
dence). Hypothetically, if (i) the share of constrained agents was sufficiently large,
(ii) the surge of these agents’ income was particularly pronounced, and (iii) post-
tax income for unconstrained agents was declining, the income reaction may wash
out on aggregate; paralleled by (iv) consumption dynamics that would have to be
dominated by constrained consumers. For instance, if we assumed that spending
programs throughout the postwar U.S. history were financed by hikes of taxes ex-
clusively for Ricardian households—keeping the tax burden for rule-of-thumb house-
holds unchanged—resulting aggregate dynamics may be consistent with consump-
tion crowding-in despite fixed aggregate income dynamics. However, such a stylized
scenario is hard to align with historical experience and U.S. policy conduct; in line
with this reasoning, Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018) argue that, for instance, in-
come tax increases exclusively for top incomes constitute a counterfactual for the
U.S. economy.
To rule out composition effects along these lines more formally, we need to resort
to data on income dynamics of constrained versus unconstrained agents. Model-
consistent, disaggregate data to conduct such an analysis are, unfortunately, not
available for the U.S. economy at business cycle frequencies over our sample pe-
riod. However, Piketty et al. (2018) provide a valuable source of information on the
full distributional characteristics of household income. For the U.S. economy, their
database provides consecutive time-series of real, post-tax income developments for
the entire income distribution, from 1966 until 2014. We use this disaggregate data
(in population-normalized terms) to proxy for borrowing constraints that are at
the heart of limited asset market participation models as follows. Specifically, we re-
place the aggregate time-series of personal disposable income in the benchmark VAR
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against each quintile of the income distribution and study potential heterogeneity
in the effects of public spending on these different groups of income.15
In a first step, we re-estimate the VAR using aggregate income data over the
sample period from 1966-2014, for which disaggregate data are available, for com-
parison (Figure 2, fourth element). Again, we observe consumption crowding-in;
and post-tax income responds positively, but insignificantly so. The extra effect of
impacting income is even a bit smaller than in the benchmark model, but overall our
inference appears to be in tact during this sample. In a second step, we now explore
evidence using disaggregate income series (Figure 2, entries five to nine). Aggregate
consumption—for which no disaggregate counterpart data do exist—appears to be
fairly insensitive to the inclusion of disaggregate income measures by still responding
significantly positive to the shock. For the lowest income quintile, income dynamics
are larger relative to other quintiles, yet, the impulse response is estimated with
high uncertainty. Richer households tend to benefit less from the stimulus in terms
of income dynamics, by exhibiting smaller and typically insignificant coefficients.
If these results were to mask important composition effects, we should observe siz-
able marginal effects stemming from the rise of post-tax income for low-earning
households; that is, their income position should explain large parts of aggregate
consumption crowding-in. The red diamond in the lower panel of the Figure rejects
such a narrative: the extra effect that impacting income of these households adds
to the consumption response is minuscule. If anything, this marginal effect even
reveals the wrong sign, which is due to the fact that the impulse response of low-
earning households’ income declines over medium horizons, which is not reported in
Figure 2. Taken together, we find no evidence of important composition effects in
disaggregate income data that our aggregate results may have masked.
3 Fiscal stimulus, consumption, and household debt
How is it possible that consumption responds positively to stimulus programs if
income, across its distribution, can not (fully) explain this reaction? Although
our VAR framework, by including the budget deficit, accounts for the prominently
discussed role of public sector debt (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; Reinhart et al.,
2012) the model is, up to this point, silent on the role of private sector leverage.
In the following, we test whether conditional variation in households’ indebtedness
constitutes a transmission mechanism of fiscal policy in a structural VAR, which
15The working hypothesis in this setting is that the fraction of the income distribution repre-
senting the lowest-earning households, i.e., the fifth quintile, is likely to capture Non-Ricardians.
Disaggregate income data are provided annually, which we interpolate to the quarterly frequency.
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may offer a path to structurally corroborate our findings. The notion is that in
excess to supporting post-tax income, consumers raise their debt position to finance
the observed expansion in household absorption.
By explicitly testing the hypothesis of stimulus propagating via household debt,
we link our evidence on consumption crowding-in to the literature documenting large
macroeconomic repercussions emerging from changes in household balance sheets or
bank credit growth (e.g., Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Mian et al., 2017). Quite
striking movements of private debt can be identified during the U.S. mortgage cycle,
which marked its peak prior to the Great Recession. We explicitly capture this boom-
and-bust episode, which was paralleled by substantial swings in the fiscal policy
stance, in our VAR. In doing so, we put the literature on autonomous credit-variation
into perspective by analyzing systematic reactions of private debt, conditional on
shifts in public spending. Our approach is therefore also closely related to Bernardini
and Peersman (2018), who analyze how deviations of domestic non-financial private
sector debt-to-GDP ratios from their trend path affect the fiscal output-multiplier in
historical U.S. data as a state—yet not as a transmission—variable (see Demyanyk
et al., 2019). Cloyne and Surico (2017) use U.K. survey data and document the
consumption response to variation in income taxes to be more pronounced for U.K.
mortgagors relative to outright home owners; thus stressing the role of private debt
as a propagation mechanism for fiscal policy, as we do.
We proceed by (i) proposing extensions to the reduced-form fiscal VAR that allow
us to study credit conditions, (ii) discussing adjustments to recover the model’s
structural form in an attempt to make identification more credible in a macro-
financial setting, and (iii) presenting the corresponding findings, before (iv) providing
sensitivity analysis within the SVAR-IV framework.
3.1 Modeling the interplay of credit conditions and the fiscal policy stance
To model the joint dynamics of the fiscal policy stance and of fluctuations in private
debt markets, we add to the fiscal VAR representation measures of prices and quan-
tities of credit that are relevant for households. In terms of credit volumes, we rely
on the subsequent debt stocks from the U.S. Flow of Funds database, which enter
the VAR in logged, GDP deflator-normalized, seasonally-adjusted, per capita terms:
overall consumer credit granted by banks, the volume of outstanding home mortgage
contracts, and overall household indebtedness. In terms of prices for credit, we are
not aware of a consistent and consecutive series on lending rates for U.S. households
over our sample period that is available at the quarterly frequency. Thus we proxy
overall household borrowing conditions by Moody’s Baa corporate bond yields, as
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in Bachmann and Ru¨th (2020), and further study, more household-specific, Federal-
Housing-Agency-provided mortgage interest rates, as observed in secondary markets.
Mortgage interest rates are, however, only available from 1964.
Against the backdrop of our VAR’s rich specification, comprising four lags and
nine variables (including fiscal news for which we had not reported IRFs), we rotate
one pair of credit market quantities and prices jointly into the VAR, once at a time.
Given the typically insignificant nature of the response of hours worked in our VAR,
we only proxy labor market conditions in these credit-augmented fiscal VARs by
the real wage and abstract from dynamics in hours worked in the estimations for
parsimony; that is, the credit-augmented VARs consist of ten variables, measured
at the quarterly frequency.16
3.2 Identifying fiscal policy shocks in the presence of financial variables
To obtain the unobservable government spending shocks from Equation (1), i.e., to
make a structural analysis feasible in our baseline model, we have recovered the pa-
rameters in A0 by a Cholesky-factorization of the reduced-form variance-covariance
matrix. While this approach of imposing timing-restrictions appears to be plausible
as long as our aim is to orthogonalize shifts in the fiscal policy stance from sys-
tematic reactions to the macroeconomic environment, such contemporaneous zero-
restrictions are hard to defend in the presence of fast-moving and forward-looking
financial time-series. This concern of simultaneity has been acknowledged and ad-
dressed by, e.g., Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Caldara and Herbst (2019), for the
case of monetary policy shocks.17 We borrow from this strand of literature and
tackle the identification challenge, for the case of fiscal policy shocks, by employing
information from outside of the VAR, i.e., an external instrument. This SVAR-
IV methodology allows to recover the unexpected innovations in public spending
without necessitating exclusion-restrictions on the contemporaneous relations in the
model. By contrast, the identifying information can be obtained from an external
proxy-series that correlates with the government spending shock, but is contempo-
raneously uncorrelated with the remaining shocks in the system (see Caldara and
Kamps, 2017, for a related strategy involving non-fiscal proxies). Conditional on the
discretionary selection by the researcher of such a proxy, the identification is data-
determined and the parameters in A0 can be recovered, even if the VAR comprises
16Note that results are insensitive to maintaining hours in the VAR as an eleventh variable.
17Moreover, Caldara and Kamps (2017) argue that recursively-recovered fiscal policy shocks
may suffer from similar simultaneity problems regarding contemporaneous fluctuations in economic
activity. Such reservation may be particularly valid for financial variables, which typically reveal
strong leading properties for business cycle movements.
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macro-financial linkages. In what follows, we characterize the instrument we will
consider, and refer to Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013) for
details on the implementation of the SVAR-IV.
Following Barro and Redlick (2011), we employ changes in actual military spend-
ing relative to lagged real GDP as an external instrument.18 In our application, by
contrast, we use this external information to recover the structural parameters of a
fully-specified VAR model and to trace dynamic responses over time (see Miyamoto
et al., 2019, for a local projections approach using military spending as an instru-
ment). Why should such variation in military expenditures serve as an external
instrument? The answer is: because it plausibly meets the so-called relevance and
exclusion restrictions of a proper instrument. With regard to instrument relevance,
military spending displays substantial swings in the sample and contributes sub-
stantially to the variability in overall fiscal spending; more importantly, it plausibly
exhibits comovement with the unobserved policy innovations of interest in εt. In
fact, when we calculate the correlation of the military spending instrument with
the Cholesky-identified shocks from Section 2, we obtain significantly positive co-
efficients. To test the relevance of the instrument more formally and to construct
consistent confidence intervals in the SVAR-IV setting, we follow Montiel Olea et al.
(2018). In terms of the exclusion restriction, military expenditures are known to
be regularly driven by conditions abroad, especially geopolitical instability such as
events in Middle East. Consequently, shifts in military expenditures that reflect do-
mestic economic or financial conditions are plausibly not an important driver. This
proposition can be corroborated by calculating correlations of the instrument with
changes in GDP or interest rates/spreads. Throughout, these coefficients are esti-
mated close-to-zero and statistically insignificantly different from zero. In addition,
we propose alternatives to the baseline instrument for robustness in Section 3.4.
3.3 The interplay of the fiscal policy stance and household credit
In a first step, we formally test the strength of changes in military spending as an
instrument. To do so, we calculate a Wald statistic under the null-hypothesis that
the instrument is irrelevant, i.e., that it does not correlate with the unobserved gov-
ernment spending innovations. Following the methodology of Montiel Olea et al.
18Using news about military spending, which foreshadow public spending materializing in the
future, is not a viable strategy since we are interested in unexpected shifts in the fiscal policy stance.
Moreover, news series are known to be a weak instrument for unexpected short-run variation in
public spending (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018). Note, however, that while this variable will not serve
as the primary source of information for identification, our VAR will still account for news on
military spending in an attempt to tackle fiscal foresight concerns.
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(2018), we estimate a Wald statistic of 54.3, which remarkably crosses critical values
to reject the Null of a weak instrument, at conventional significance levels. Thus,
changes in military spending represent a “strong” instrument for identification. Fig-
ure 3 traces adjustment patterns for the credit-augmented fiscal VAR, conditional on
an unexpected (one percent) surge of public spending that we identify by changes in
military spending as an external instrument; the selected measures of credit market
volumes and prices are overall household debt and non-mortgage bond yields.
Figure 3: SVAR-IV public spending shock and credit markets
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Notes: We plot dynamics at the quarterly frequency. Solid blue lines represent point
estimates of impulse response functions obtained from the SVAR-IV model. Dark to light
shaded areas display 50, 68, and 90 percent confidence intervals, which we obtain from the
weak-instrument robust procedure in Montiel Olea et al. (2018).
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Despite the fact that government spending processes the exogenous shock in a
more immediate way, i.e., the impulse response moves faster toward the conditional
mean relative to Figure 1 in which the response was hump-shaped, the overall ad-
justment patterns of the core set of variables are consistent with our main results up
to this point. In particular, public stimulus induces a surge in private consumption
expenditures, which is paralleled by persistent improvements in post-tax income.
Reinforcing the empirical literature on consumption crowding-in, we thus provide
evidence that the conditional rise in private spending is a robust empirical regular-
ity, even in a setting that does not require contemporaneous zero-restrictions. In
addition, this observation validates our former results from a Cholesky-scheme that
had disregarded the critique of Caldara and Kamps (2017) of existing within quarter
feedback from economic activity to public spending.
As an additional novel finding, we add to the literature by reporting that fiscal
spending significantly propagates through the debt position of households: overall
indebtedness increases on impact, slowly builds up until the third post-shock year—
reaching its peak response around 0.6 percent above the pre-shock trend-path—
before slowly reverting back toward zero. At the same time, borrowing conditions
for households, roughly proxied by long-term corporate bond yields, appear to soften.
Private interest rates, namely, mirror the reaction of household debt qualitatively,
i.e., we observe a hump-shaped decline in credit rates which trough around roughly
minus ten basis points, one year after the shock has hit. Related, Ramey (2011)
reveals consistent findings in a recursive VAR that she uses to recover military
news shocks. Our aggregate evidence on the conditional response of credit markets
further aligns with Auerbach et al. (2020), who study local credit markets employing
geographical variation in U.S. federal government contracts across U.S. cities.
In Figure 4, we zoom into the components driving these results in more detail,
first, by re-estimating the SVAR-IV model using the sub-component of mortgage
debt along with mortgage interest rates and, second, by including the consumer
credit component along with the benchmark interest rate series. We restrict the
presentation to the core set of variables of interest for the sake of a more parsimo-
nious illustration. Panel (a) reveals that the importance of household leverage as
an endogenous propagation mechanism of fiscal stimulus is even more sizable when
focusing on mortgage indebtedness, which is the major component of overall house-
hold debt. Mortgage debt wins the horse race in the sense that the magnitude of the
mortgage debt reaction exceeds the counterpart reaction of overall debt by increas-
ing around 1.1 percent. In addition, the impulse response is statistically different
from zero almost throughout the entire forecast horizon. Correspondingly, mortgage
18
interest rates process the shock more strongly, as well, and decline by roughly 20 ba-
sis points. In Panel (b), the according adjustment patterns for consumer credit are
consistent, albeit less pronounced. The impulse response is sticky at short horizons,
smaller in absolute magnitude, and estimated with less precision. The interest rate
response appears more protracted in this scenario, too. Notably, once we model con-
sumer credit explicitly in the SVAR-IV model, disposable income declines at short
horizons and remains statistically insignificant after passing-through its conditional
mean into positive territory. The impulse response function of private consumption,
however, is fairly insensitive to the inclusion of consumer credit, revealing through-
out positive coefficients.
Figure 4: Mortgage debt and mortgage interest & consumer credit and interest rate
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(a) Mortgage credit volumes/prices
Disposable Income
0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters
-0.6
-0.3
0
0.3
0.6
Pe
rc
en
t
Consumption
0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters
-0.6
-0.3
0
0.3
0.6
Pe
rc
en
t
Consumer Credit
0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters
-1
0
1
2
Pe
rc
en
t
Private Interest Rate
0 4 8 12 16 20
Quarters
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
(b) Consumer credit volumes/prices
Notes: We plot dynamics at the quarterly frequency. Solid blue lines represent point
estimates of impulse response functions obtained from the SVAR-IV model. Dark to light
shaded areas display 50, 68, and 90 percent confidence intervals, which we obtain from
the weak-instrument robust procedure in Montiel Olea et al. (2018). Panel (a) on the left
displays IRFs for a fiscal VAR that is augmented by mortgage debt and mortgage interest
rates; Panel (b) on the right presents IRFs for a fiscal VAR that is augmented by consumer
credit and corporate bond yields.
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These observations corroborate our inference that increases in disposable in-
come of households do not suffice to rationalize, why consumption is crowded-in via
public stimulus. In particular, we show that there exists a striking leverage that
public spending exerts on the debt position of households, raising the latter between
0.5 and one percent, depending on the empirical specification. This finding is re-
markable as it implies that, contrary to state-of-the art limited asset participation
models, consumers without access to capital markets can not be the only explana-
tion to rationalize crowding-in of private spending. By contrast, the result of surges
in household debt implies that also intertemporally optimizing consumers with ac-
cess to credit markets are prompted to take on more debt, presumably reinforcing
consumption crowding-in. In particular, the dynamics revealed by our VAR stress
that this mechanism is likely to be operative particularly via the mortgage debt
component of private indebtedness.
Specifically for the U.S. economy, the link of mortgage debt and consumption
expenditures—non-durable goods included—is known to be strong, among others,
due to the common practice of home equity extraction (see, e.g., Mian and Sufi,
2011, for evidence on household borrowing via the so-called home equity lines of
credit).19 We add to this line of research the finding that the debt channel also kicks
in endogenously, when conditioning on exogenous variation in public spending. The
prominent role of mortgage—and thus long-term—debt in the propagation of the
shock further aligns with results from an additional exercise: once we include the
durable expenditures component in the baseline consumption variable, crowding-in
of private spending is reinforced. The maximum deviation of private spending from
its trend increases by approximately 30 percent, relative to the counterpart that
excludes durable consumption items.
3.4 Sensitivity analysis for the SVAR-IV setting
Ultimately, we scrutinize our SVAR-IV results along the following dimensions. First,
we perform several modifications to the baseline instrument. Instead of expressing
changes in military spending relative to lagged real GDP (Barro and Redlick, 2011),
we (i) use the civilian population as the normalizing series instead; (ii) we study
raw changes in military spending; and (iii) we employ the residual from an AR(1)-
regression applied to the benchmark instrument. These adjustments barely affect
the impulse response dynamics; the corresponding results are available upon request
19There is ample empirical evidence documenting that mortgage financing for households has
become a driving factor in commercial banks’ lending to the household sector, with the share of
mortgage loans on banks’ balance sheets having doubled in advanced economies over the course of
the twentieth century (Jorda` et al., 2016).
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from the authors. Second, as an alternative to using military spending, we introduce
professional forecast errors, gfet , on overall public spending as an instrument into the
VAR model, as proposed in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). While these au-
thors identify unanticipated variation in public spending by modeling forecast errors
in a recursive VAR with gfet ordered first, we, by contrast, deploy this information
as an instrument. As explained above, the SVAR-IV strategy appears to be more
appropriate in our setting, as it is insensitive to the ordering of variables and relaxes
contemporaneous exclusion-restrictions, thus capturing the simultaneous interplay
of macroeconomic and financial variables that enter our VAR.
In a first step, we calculate the Wald statistic to test the strength of this alter-
native instrument, which amounts to 29.2, i.e., forecast errors are likely not subject
to weak instrument concerns.20 In a second step, we track in Figure 5 the dy-
namics of a one percent increase in public spending that is identified by forecast
errors of professional forecaster. Overall, our inference does not change in this alter-
native specification, although the impulse response coefficients are estimated with
somewhat less precision. Interestingly, the conditional cycle of household debt is
quantitatively more pronounced relative to Figure 3; the maximum deviation from
the conditional mean exceeds 1 percent. After an initial spike, credit rates ease by
more than 10 basis points over the medium run.
As a final modification to our baseline SVAR-IV setting, we analyze to what
extent the military-proxy can be used to recover innovations in more disaggregate
government spending data, i.e., we separately identify government consumption and
government investment shocks. The respective Wald statistics amount to 36.3 and
33.7, respectively; that is both disaggregate surprises in public spending can be
recovered via a strong military spending instrument. The triggered dynamics of
these shocks with respect to household debt and credit rates are depicted in Figure
6. The expansion in credit appears to be similar in size for both shocks, albeit
the shock procession is more persistent in the case of the innovation in government
investment. At the same time, interest rates ease significantly for the government
consumption shock, whereas the corresponding impulse response is rather flat in the
case of a surprise in government investment.
20Note that the forecast error data is only available from 1966Q3. The corresponding Wald
statistic for our benchmark military spending instrument over the same starting in 1966Q3 is 44.5.
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Figure 5: SVAR-IV public spending shock using professional forecast errors
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Notes: We plot dynamics at the quarterly frequency. Solid blue lines represent point
estimates of impulse response functions obtained from the SVAR-IV model. Dark to
light shaded areas display 50, 68, and 90 percent confidence intervals, which we obtain
from the weak-instrument robust procedure in Montiel Olea et al. (2018). Due to data
availability, the sample covers data ranging from 1966Q3 to 2008Q4, as in Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012).
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Figure 6: Disaggregate public spending shocks: investment versus consumption
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Notes: We plot dynamics at the quarterly frequency for impulse response functions from
the SVAR-IV that is identified by forecast errors on government spending (Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko, 2012). Solid blue lines (with diamonds) represent point estimates for
a government investment shock and shaded areas display the corresponding 68 percent
confidence intervals (Montiel Olea et al., 2018). Solid black lines (with circles) represent
point estimates for a government consumption shock, and confidence intervals are given
as dashed black lines.
4 The transmission mechanism of stimulus to private debt
In this Section, we ultimately provide some tentative insight into the transmission
mechanisms that drive our novel aggregate results, i.e., we offer some first-path guid-
ance on what actually underlies the conditional surge of households’ debt position
that helps to sustain consumption. To study such propagation channels, we add to
the SVAR-IV model from Figure 3 one additional time-series at a time and report
the dynamics for this variable in isolation.
Fisher effects For instance, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010) argues that in the pres-
ence of financial frictions and multi-period nominal debt contracts, “Fisher effects”
may kick in; that is, boosts in inflation may reduce finance premia for borrowing
money and thus stimulate debt accumulation and amplify the macroeconomic reper-
cussions of fiscal stimulus. We scrutinize this proposition by incorporating the log
of the GDP-deflator and, alternatively, the PCE-deflator into the SVAR-IV model.
Panel (a) of Figure 7 illustrates the corresponding impulse response functions, which
both reveal a negative, hump-shaped procession of the shock. A surge in public
spending hence unleashes dis-inflationary dynamics in our setting, which aligns with
empirical findings of, e.g., D’Alessandro et al. (2019). However, while these authors
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rely on a Cholesky-identification, our external instruments approach—allowing for
simultaneous feedback from prices to government spending—still establishes the dis-
inflation result (see Zubairy, 2014, for an estimated DSGE model). Put together, it
is unlikely that the conditional debt cycle we observe is driven by Fisher effects.
Passive monetary policy Another related mechanism that is typically empha-
sized in theoretical strands of the literature is that active monetary policy dampens
the effects of fiscal stimulus (e.g., Christiano et al., 2011), which may particularly ex-
tend to its influence on private credit markets. Considering the declining price levels
we have established above in conjunction with conventional central bank reaction
functions, such counteracting factors appear to be unlikely to apply in our setting,
ex ante. To test such a narrative, we study the conditional dynamics of risk-free
rates, i.e., the Federal funds rate and 10-year Treasury yields, in real terms.21 Panel
(b) of Figure 7 shows that in line with the first panel of the Figure, monetary policy
softens and interest rates at the longer end of the yield curve do not reveal significant
cost pressure for credit markets as well. These results, in addition, hold for nominal
interest rates (not reported). Overall, we do not observe tightening financial condi-
tions, as proxied by risk-free rates, that may depress equilibrium debt. The evidence
is instead consistent with the expansion in credit markets that we document.
Softening of credit market constraints Closely related to the mechanism
stressed by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010), Carrillo and Poilly (2013) argue that fiscal
policy, if propagated via imperfect financial markets, may more directly support
credit conditions. By stimulating economic activity and by supporting asset prices,
public spending may inflate collateral values of borrowers (firms in their case). As
a consequence and due to improved balance sheets of borrowers, their access to
credit eases, which precipitates in a compression of credit spreads. We inspect such
a mechanism by, first, studying to what extent fiscal stimulus widens or narrows
interest rate spreads in credit markets. We do so, by analyzing long-term interest
rates in relative terms to, e.g., the Treasury yield following convention (in the case
of the mortgage rate) or Moody’s Aaa bond yield (in the case of the Baa yield as in
Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek, 2012, to alleviate cash-flow or duration mismatch). Second,
we track the dynamics of house prices, in real and nominal terms, as provided by
Shiller (2005), to evaluate how collateral values of households absorb the surge in
public spending.
21We follow Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012) and calculate nominal interest rates relative to the
lagged growth rate of the PCE-deflator. Our results are robust to using the shadow rate of Wu
and Xia (2016) instead of the nominal Federal funds rate; alternatively, restricting the analysis to
pre-Great Recession data does not affect the result.
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Figure 7: Inspecting the transmission channel of fiscal spending to credit markets
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Notes: We plot dynamics at the quarterly frequency. Solid blue lines (with diamonds)
represent point estimates of impulse response functions for the variable denoted in the
respective panel legend, which we obtain from the SVAR-IV model. Shaded areas display
68 percent confidence intervals (Montiel Olea et al., 2018). In each panel, we study an
alternative measure (see legend in each panel) for which the point estimates are represented
by solid black lines (with circles), and confidence intervals are given as dashed black lines.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 7 present the corresponding results. Panel (c)
is suggestive to easier lending conditions being part of the story, as we observe a
hump-shaped drop in credit spreads. Beyond potential shifts in the sovereign yield
curve—as depicted in Panel (b) of Figure 7—a financial accelerator mechanism thus
appears to be at work (Bernanke et al., 1999). Baa corporate bond yields measured
relative to their Aaa corporate bond yield counterpart, deviate negatively from their
conditional mean, reaching their trough in the third year after the shock, before
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leveling off. The result of narrowing spreads also extends to spreads for mortgage
credit.22 The last panel of the Figure further reveals significant asset price inflation;
the level of real estate prices rises on impact, both in nominal and real terms. Real
house prices subsequently rise by more than 0.5 percent, two years after the shock.
These dynamics make a case for a collateral channel through which fiscal stimulus
compresses credit spreads and impacts on households’ debt position, in the presence
of financial frictions (see, e.g., Carrillo and Poilly, 2013).
5 Conclusion
Can public spending stimulate the economy and if so, how? These questions are
some of the oldest and certainly most important ones, around which large parts of
the history of macroeconomics have centered and which received renewed attention
during the rapidly unfolding economic disruptions at the onset of the Great Reces-
sion. A crucial mechanism that policymakers often seek to activate in order to boost
economic activity, is triggering private via public spending. For instance, fiscal stim-
ulus payments, such as the tax rebates ranging between $ 500 and $ 1,000 that U.S.
Congress authorized during the economic slowdowns of 2001 and the Great Reces-
sion, can be viewed as a type of public intervention that was directly intended to raise
household absorption. Of course, the success of stimulating private spending—the
largest component of aggregate demand—through public stimulus critically hinges
on the specific calibration and composition of the public spending program under
consideration. Unfortunately, such interventions may not always cause the behav-
ioral adaptions policymakers intend to induce; in this vein, Hoekstra et al. (2017)
provide evidence that the 2009 $ 3 billion Cash for Clunkers scrappage program,
which was—apart from the idea to put safer and more fuel-efficient vehicles on U.S.
roadways—explicitly tailored to promote private spending, might actually have re-
duced net total vehicle spending by $ 5 billion.
The good news is, however, that empirical evidence by a vast number of time-
series contributions supports the notion of unexpected shifts in fiscal spending signif-
icantly raising private consumption expenditures for aggregate data and on average
across programs, in postwar U.S. data. The bad news is, however, we structurally
still do not satisfactorily understand why consumption reacts in this way. While
crowding-in is at odds with the predictions of plain-vanilla New-Keynesian models,
22These findings put the results of Born et al. (2020) into perspective, who document a widening
of the sovereign default premium in response to a cut in public spending in a sample of 38 countries,
on average over the business cycle. They establish their findings using exclusion-restrictions that
identify their VAR.
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there is a fast growing literature that tries to rationalize this empirical regularity.
Yet, with all contributions offering “one solution to a fiscal policy puzzle” (Bil-
biie, 2011), the transmission mechanism of public to private spending is still not
well-understood. Consequently, rigorous empirical testing of alternative theoretical
approaches is key to a better understanding of the propagation of fiscal stimulus.
In this paper, we provide comprehensive empirical evidence that the most widely-
adopted modeling device of rationalizing consumption crowding-in by giving dispos-
able income of households a meaningful role, may be insufficient once judged from
an empirical perspective. In fact, we observe consumption crowding-in effects, even
in the absence of movements in disaggregate and aggregate measures of post-tax
income, in postwar U.S. data. Complementing this finding, we test the hypothe-
sis, whether variation in household indebtedness may reinforce the pass-through of
public to private spending; thereby we further corroborate the finding that post-tax
income may be an insufficient empirical moment to study. We do so, by carefully
modeling the simultaneous interplay of the fiscal policy stance, household consump-
tion, after-tax income, and private credit markets in a structural VAR model that is
identified by an external instrument.23 Indeed, we observe a striking role for public
spending to prompt surges in the debt position of households; this leverage that
fiscal policy exerts on credit markets appears to be particularly strong for the mort-
gage component of household indebtedness. In addition, the significant household
debt cycle and the crowding-in of household absorption are paralleled by declining
interest rates in credit markets. This conditional divergence of prices and quantities
in credit markets is suggestive to accommodating financial conditions underlying our
results. To better understand this mechanism, we provide some first-path guidance:
First, we do not find counteracting effects stemming from risk-free rates, such as
the Fed’s policy instrument or 10-year Treasury yields. Second, since we observe
declining price levels, our results are unlikely to be driven by Fisher effects. Third,
we reveal a narrowing of interest spreads in credit markets and, fourth, public stim-
ulus significantly improves real estate prices. The latter two results prompt the view
of looser collateral constraints—brought about by rising collateral prices—and thus
easier access to credit markets for households, reinforcing the conditional comove-
ment of private spending and the debt position of the household sector.
To put our paper into perspective, we emphasize that for an analysis of the
macroeconomic repercussions of public stimulus, more generally, it is vital to care-
23We thus also add to the literature the observation that consumption crowding-in prevails in
a time-series setting that abstracts from zero- or sign-restrictions imposed to recover the VAR’s
structural form.
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fully address the question of how public spending propagates into private credit
markets. Future research should explicitly take into account the dynamic inter-
actions we have identified and should attempt to improve our knowledge on how
credit supply and demand conditions react to public stimulus. Making progress
toward that direction is crucial to better inform the calibration of and modeling
strategies for theoretical approaches that aim to inform policymakers. In addition,
further work on the transmission channel of public spending into private credit mar-
kets may provide a clearer picture on how discretionary fiscal policy can be used as
a tool for macroeconomic stabilization. Specifically, in the presence of a private debt
channel, countercyclical fiscal policy may be desirable during economic downturns
not only due to conventional mechanisms, but because of the stabilizing effect it
may exert on private credit markets. In the case of recessions that are triggered or
accompanied by pronounced private sector deleveraging, such considerations may be
of first-order importance.
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